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NOTES
Seizing Obscenity: New York v. P.J. Video, Inc. and the Waning
of Presumptive Protection
The printed word and visual image have long enjoyed special protection
under the laws of the United States. This special protection, embodied in the
first amendment,1 stems directly from the esteem in which the founding fathers
held freedom of thought.2 Generally, the courts have treated the constitutional
protection provided to books and images deferentially to ensure the continued
free dissemination of thoughts and ideas.3 Pornography and obscenity prosecu-
tions have provided a wellspring of precedent for first amendment protections
because these cases raise fundamental questions about the appropriate balance
between morality and free speech in our society.
4
United States Supreme Court loldings in the last few decades represent a
shift from relatively expansive first amendment protection under the Warren
Court to a significantly more inhibitive fourth amendment under the Burger
Court.5 Although the first and fourth amendments both constrain governmental
power, they do so in substantially different ways. The first amendment provides
protection to ideas, regardless of form.6 The fourth amendment provides pro-
tection from unreasonable seizures without reference to the nature of the articles
seized. 7 If seizures are analyzed in terms of the first amendment, the seized
materials are presumptively protected at the outset. This protection calls for
1. The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONsr. amend. I.
2. See Cox, Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1, 1-3
(1980); Comment, A Fourth Amendment Gag Order-Upholding Third Party Searches at the Expense
of First Amendment Freedom of Association Guarantees, 47 U. Pr. L. REv. 257, 267 (1985).
3. See generally Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714-19 (1931) (discussing the historical
deference courts and society have given to the freedom to disseminate ideas); Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 375-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (explaining why the courts give great defer-
ence to the freedom to disseminate ideas).
4. See Clor, Obscenity and the First Amendment: Round Three, 7 Loy. L. Rav. 207, 207
(1974); see also Berbysse, Conflict in the Courts: Obscenity Control & First Amendment Freedoms, 20
CATH. LAW. 1 (1974) (tracing and evaluating the moral component in the Court's elimination of
obscenity from first amendment protection).
5. See Fahringer & Brown, The Rise and Fall of Roth-A Critique of the Recent Supreme
Court Obscenity Decisions, 10 CRIM. L. BuLL. 785 (1974). Much of this change may be attributable
to President Nixon's more conservative appointments to the Court. Nixon appointed four Justices
to the Court in the two year period 1969-1971: Chief Justice Burger in 1969, Justice Blackmun in
1970, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist in 1971. Yarbrough, The Burger Court and Freedom of
Expression, 33 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 37, 37 n.2 (1976).
6. All speech and exchange of ideas are protected by the first amendment so long as they are
within the definition of first amendment speech. That is, unless speech is excluded from the first
amendment it is presumed to be protected. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text. It is this
presumption that protects the free dissemination of ideas because it creates protection inherent in the
nature of the speech.
7. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The right of the peo-
ple to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue but upon probable cause." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
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special considerations in the materials' seizure. Under a fourth amendment
analysis, however, the nature of the seized materials is irrelevant and only the
process is subject to constitutional examination. When seizures of first amend-
ment materials are constrained only by the fourth amendment's protection, the
materials effectively lose the presumptive protection of the first amendment. In
the recent case of New York v. P.. Video, Inc.8 the Supreme Court enunciated a
common fourth amendment standard for the evidentiary seizure of allegedly ob-
scene materials, unrestrained by any presumptive protection from the first
amendment.
This Note reviews the controlling precedent for the seizure of allegedly ob-
scene materials and examines the P.J. Video Court's holding in light thereof. It
demonstrates that P.J. Video is remarkable in three respects. Primarily, the de-
cision is indicative of a societal trend towards lesser tolerance for pornography
and obscenity. This intolerance has led to the effective eradication of presump-
tive protection for evidentiary seizures of alleged obscenity. Second, the holding
is indicative of the Supreme Court's continued willingness to overrule state court
decisions protecting individual liberties, in favor of state prosecutorial agencies.
This is a trend that has been strongly criticized as beyond the proper jurisdiction
of the Court. Third, the internal logic of the Court's opinion, most notably its
interpretation of the New York Court of Appeals' holding, is flawed. The Note
concludes that the total effect of the holding in P.J. Video is to lessen the protec-
tion that the first amendment ostensibly provides to books and films that are
presumptively within the area of protected speech.
P.J. Video originated in the Justice Court of the Village of Depew, New
York. After viewing copies of ten films rented from defendant, an investigator
for the Erie County District Attorney's Office prepared affidavits describing the
films' contents and attached them to an application for a warrant to seize the
films, alleging that they violated the state's obscenity law. 9 The warrant applica-
tion was then submitted to a New York Supreme Court Justice, who issued the
warrant after an ex parte proceeding.10 Each affidavit was similar in form and
content'1 and contained: (1) an identification of the affiant, (2) an identification
of the film, (3) a description of the circumstances of the viewing, and (4) a list of
the sexual acts depicted in the film. This last element was preceded in each case
by a statement that the list described the "content and character" of the video. 12
On the force of the warrant, thirteen video cassettes were seized and defendant
was subsequently charged with violating New York's obscenity statute.1 3
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the warrant
8. 106 S. Ct. 1610 (1986).
9. Id. at 1612. The State's obscenity law provided, in part, that "[a] person is guilty of obscen-
ity in the third degree when knowing its content and character, he: 1. Promotes, or possesses with
intent to promote, any obscene material .... " N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.05(1) (McKinney Supp.
1986).
10. P.J. Video, 106 S. Ct. at 1612.
11. The affidavits ranged in length from I 1 to 27 lines. Respondent's Brief at 9, P.J. Video.
12. PJ. Video, 106 S. Ct. at 1616-19.
13. Of the 13 videos seized, 5 were multiple copies. The net result was seizure of 1 or more
copies of 8 titles. Respondent's Brief at 2, P.J. Video.
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authorizing the seizure was issued without probable cause to believe the videos
were obscene. The Justice Court granted the motion and dismissed the com-
plaint.14 The Erie County Court reviewed and affirmed the dismissal, and an
appeal was then taken to the New York Court of Appeals. 15 In an opinion that
cited both state and federal precedent, 16 New York's highest court affirmed the
suppression and dismissal. 17 The court first noted that prior to any seizure a
probable cause determination was required to be made by a neutral magistrate to
determine whether there was sufficient evidence to believe that the materials
sought existed and could be found in a specific place.18 The court then noted
that because seizure of first amendment materials created potential prior re-
straint concerns, the court must apply a higher standard in evaluating an appli-
cation for such a warrant.19 The court of appeals found that the probable cause
determination by the issuing Justice had been deficient and, therefore, seizure of
the films had violated defendant's rights.20 The court characterized the affida-
vits as amounting to little more than lists of sexual activity, 21 which could not
sustain a finding of probable obscenity under New York's tripartite definition. 22
The court reasoned that because the affidavits did not provide an adequate basis
for a magistrate to determine probable cause, seizure of the videos based solely
on such affidavits was unlawful.2 3
After three consistent holdings by the New York courts that the warrant in
question was issued without probable cause, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari24 to resolve the "proper standard for issuance of a warrant
authorizing the seizure of materials presumptively protected by the first amend-
14. P.RJ Video, 106 S. Ct. at 1613.
15. Id.
16. The court of appeals' opinion consistently cited New York precedent followed by Supreme
Court precedent. People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 566, 483 N.E.2d 1120, 493 N.Y.S.2d 988
(1985), rev'd sub. nom, New York v. P.J. Video, 106 S. Ct. 1610 (1986). This fact indicates that the
court partially relied on state law in reaching its holding, thus calling into question the Supreme
Court's authority to overturn that portion of the lower court's holding. See infra notes 131-34 and
accompanying text.
17. P.J. Video, 65 N.Y.2d at 573, 483 N.E.2d at 1125, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
18. "No warrant shall issue except upon probable cause .... This requirement was designed to
insure that the determination of probable cause ... to believe that the property is subject to seizure
must be made by a neutral magistrate." Id. at 569, 483 N.E.2d at 1122, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 990.
19. Id. at 569-70, 483 N.E.2d at 1123, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 991. See infra note 35 (discussing the
concept of prior restraint).
20. Id. at 571-72, 483 N.E.2d at 1124-25, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 992-93.
21. Id. at 571, 483 N.E.2d at 1124, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
22. Id. New York's definition of obscenity is virtually identical to that set forth in Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and provides that
any material or performance is "obscene" if (a) the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, would find that considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to
the prurient interest in sex, and (b) it depicts or describes in a patently offensive manner,
actual or simulated: sexual intercourse, sodomy, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sadism,
masochism, excretion or lewd exhibition of the genitals, and (c) considered as a whole, it
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, and scientific value.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00(1) (McKinney 1980). The Supreme Court's decision in Miller is dis-
cussed infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
23. P.AJ Video, 65 N.Y.2d at 571-72, 483 N.E.2d at 1124-25, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 992-93.
24. New York v. P.J. Video, 106 S. Ct. 244 (1985).
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ment."'25 The Court rejected the New York Court of Appeals' use of a "higher
standard" of probable cause for seizure of allegedly obscene materials. 26 The
Court reasoned that for evidentiary seizures the fourth amendment provides ad-
equate protection for first amendment materials: "We think, and accordingly
hold, that an application for a warrant authorizing the seizure of materials pre-
sumptively protected by the first amendment should be evaluated under the
same standard of probable cause used to review warrant applications gener-
ally." 2 7 Using this standard the Court concluded that the facts before the issu-
ing magistrate were adequate for him to make a probable cause determination. 28
Having reversed three levels of the New York courts, the Supreme Court
remanded. 29
In a strongly worded dissent Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan
and Stevens, criticized the majority holding.30 Marshall questioned the Court's
interpretation of the standard used by the New York courts, which Marshall
characterized as simply that "'there must be enough information before [the
issuing magistrate] in one form or other... to enable him to judge the obscenity
of the film.' "31 Applying this standard the dissent described the holding of the
New York Court of Appeals as unassailable; "a mere listing of sex acts ... says
little about the predominant effect of the film as a whole" and as such cannot
adequately form the basis for a probable cause determination of obscenity. 32
The decision in P.J. Video is a pronouncement of the relative weights and
priorities accorded to the first and fourth amendments by the Court when alleg-
edly obscene material is seized. The early cases dealing with seizure of presump-
tively protected materials clearly established that the protections of the first
amendment were a qualification to general fourth amendment proscriptions. 33
Later cases have limited these protections, 34 not by altering the essential
subordinance of the fourth amendment to the first amendment, but largely by
characterizing the seizure to avoid prior restraint problems 35 and to assert the
25. P.J. Video, 106 S. Ct. at 1612. The Court granted certiorari ostensibly to resolve the con-
flict between the New York Court of Appeals' holding in P.J. Video and decisions in Sequoia Books,
Inc. v. McDonald, 725 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1984) (validating warranted seizure of allegedly obscene
materials when the issuing magistrate made an ex parte probable cause determination solely on the
force of descriptive affidavits filed with the warrant application) and United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d
391 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (validating issuance of a warrant to seize allegedly obscene films based solely on
a descriptive affidavit).
26. P.J. Video, 106 S. Ct. at 1616.
27. Id. at 1615.
28. "(W]e think it clear beyond peradventure that the warrant was supported by probable cause
to believe that the five films at issue were obscene." Id. at 1616.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1619-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 1620 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 566,
571, 483 N.E.2d 1120, 1124, 493 N.Y.S. 2d 988, 992 (1985).
32. Id. at 1621 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33. Comment, supra note 2, at 273-74; see infra notes 55-80 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 81-98 and accompanying text.
35. "Prior restraint" refers to methods used by the government to restrain dissemination of
presumptively protected materials, even those possibly unlawful in nature. Any statute, regulation,
or administrative procedure that acts as a prior restraint bears a "'[h]eavy presumption' against its
constitutional validity." Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). For
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protections of the fourth amendment in place of the first amendment. The
changes in the relative protections provided to allegedly obscene material by the
first and fourth amendments, as interpreted by the Court, were substantially a
reflection of the general values prevalent on the Court and in society at the time
each decision was issued.3
6
Before examining the relative balance of first and fourth amendment pro-
tections, it is necessary to delineate the legal status of obscenity. The Court has
consistently and clearly held that obscenity is not protected speech within the
meaning of the first amendment. 37 Roth v. United States38 is the leading case in
which the Court pronounced this doctrine. In Roth a citizen facing prosecution
for violation of a federal obscenity statute attempted to invoke the first amend-
ment as a protection from prosecution. 39 In rejecting this argument the Court
analyzed the historical significance of the amendment 4° and concluded that "ob-
scenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."'41
The Court noted that the first amendment was not intended to protect every
utterance42 and characterized obscenity as one category of speech excluded from
the protection of the first amendment. 43 The Court, however, did caution that
"all ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opin-
ion-have the full protection of the guaranties .... 44
Although the nonprotected status of obscenity has long been clear, its iden-
tification as such has been, and continues to be, the primary obstacle to its prose-
cution.45 The definition of obscenity has been an evolving concept46 and,
an analytical discussion of prior restraint, see Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine
in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. Rav. 53 (1984).
36. Compare THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBScENrrY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1970)
(recommending repeal of laws forbidding dissemination of obscenity to consenting adults) with I
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY: FINAL REPORT
322-85, 433-58 (1986) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT] (recommending the use of a wide variety of tools
to combat the harms perceived to be caused by obscenity and pornography). This change would
seem to reflect a change in the public's attitude toward pornography and obscenity. Id. at 932-35.
This value change is evident in the contrast between the holdings of the Burger Court and those of
the Warren Court. See Lockhart, Escape From the Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the First
Amendment, 9 GA. L. REv. 533, 544-48 (1975).
37. For a discussion of constitutional speech and nonspeech, see Schauer, Speech and
"'Speech"--Obscenity and "Obscenity" An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Lan-
guage, 67 GEo. L.J. 899 (1979).
38. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
39. Roth was a businessman in New York engaged in the sale of pornographic books,
magazines, and photographs. He used circulars sent through the mail to advertise his business.
Roth was convicted by a federal district court on four counts of violating a federal obscenity statute
prohibiting the distribution of obscene materials through the mail. Id. at 479-80.
40. The opinion cites 10 state constitutions and the journals of the continental congress, among
other documents, in tracing the limited nature of speech guarantees with respect to obscenity. Id. at
482-85.
41. Id. at 485.
42. Id. at 483.
43. Id. at 485.
44. Id. at 484.
45. Obscenity is difficult to prosecute because material is not legally obscene until judicially
declared so, and thus it is not readily identifiable. Until material is declared obscene, it has the
presumptive protection of the first amendment. For a discussion of changes in the definition of
1987]
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although the Court promulgated an explicit definition in 1973, it remains a
vague standard capable of variance from community to community. After nu-
merous attempts to define obscenity, the Court in Miller v. California47 finally
settled on a unified definition.48 Miller involved a conviction for mailing ob-
scene advertisements for various "adult" products.49 The Court rejected the
definition of obscenity used by the lower courts and promulgated a new stan-
dard. This new definition of obscenity made state statutes, "as written or au-
thoritatively construed," the primary source of determining obscenity.50 The
Court held also that the state statute must allow obscenity to be found only
when
'the average person, applying contemporary community standards'
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest... ; the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and...
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.5 1
This holding established broad guidelines for the judiciary in each state to define
obscenity, 52 but did nothing to make obscenity readily identifiable.5 3
Although obscenity clearly is not protected speech, the overriding difficulty
with obscenity prosecutions remained even after Miller. The inability to distin-
guish protected pornography readily from unprotected obscenity made prosecu-
tion difficult and fraught with constitutional challenges. These challenges
typically took the form of challenges to seizures of allegedly obscene materials
on the ground that the procedures used intruded on first amendment
protections.54
obscenity recommended to the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, see Lynn, "Civil
Rights" Ordinances and the Attorney General's Commission: New Developments in Pornography Reg-
ulation, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 27, 40-48 (1986).
46. For a general discussion of the evolution of a definition of obscenity, see Fahringer &
Brown, supra note 5; see also Note, Assessing the Constitutionality of North Carolina's New Obscenity
Law, 65 N.C.L. REv. 400 (1987) (discussing the development of the Supreme Court's obscenity
doctrine and its application to the recent amendments to North Carolina's obscenity statute).
47. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
48. Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion, traced the development of the Court's attempt to
define obscenity and the variety of platitudes used by the Court in its attempt to differentiate between
protected pornography and unprotected obscenity. Id. at 37-40 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 16.
50, By including the language "as written or authoritatively construed," the Court allowed
state courts to interpret existing obscenity statutes so as to avoid wholesale invalidation thereof. Id.
at 24 n.6.
51. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
52. Several commentators have concluded that the holding in Miller also effectively encouraged
the prosecution of obscenity by easing standards of proof for prosecutors. See George, Obscenity
Litigation: An Overview of Current Legal Controversies, 3 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 189, 190 (1977);
Yarbrough, supra note 5, at 89.
53. To the extent that the Miller definition required judicial action to determine obscenity, it
did nothing to correct either the problem of notice to the citizen or identification for the policeman.
For a discussion of the notice dilemma, see Lockhart, supra note 36.
54. Although the cases discussed in this Note involved seizure in the prosecution of violations
of criminal obscenity statutes, courts have used several other approaches for dealing with obscenity.
See Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding a dispersal zoning plan
for adult businesses); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (rejecting
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The Court has considered the validity of such first amendment challenges in
a series of cases. In the first such case, Marcus v. Search Warrant,55 a Missouri
judge issued a search warrant for a newsstand after an ex parte probable cause
determination that it contained obscene materials. 56 In determining probable
cause, the judge relied solely on the affidavit of a police officer who testified that
the premises to be searched contained five magazines that were obscene.5 7 The
warrant authorized the seizure of all "obscene" materials on the premises and
provided no guidance for defining obscenity.5 8 The search resulted in the whole-
sale seizure of all copies of materials on the premises that, in the judgment of the
seizing officers, were obscene.5 9
In rejecting the Missouri statute that sanctioned the seizure, the Court
noted that "a State is not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing
with obscenity... without regard to the possible consequences for constitution-
ally protected speech."'60 The Court focused on the protection provided the
seized material by the first amendment in declaring the actions constitutionally
impermissible.6 1 The Court considered the lack of a preseizure hearing to deter-
mine obscenity, the broad nature of the warrant, and the discretionary power of
the police to determine what was obscene; and concluded these factors were not
"designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity," 62 nor did they
afford "a reasonable likelihood that nonobscene publications, entitled to consti-
tutional protection, [would] reach the public."' 63 The Court further noted that
the seizure of all copies of all allegedly obscene works" constituted a prior re-
as unconstitutional an Indianapolis ordinance making pornography illegal as a form of sex discrimi-
nation); Fahringer & Cambria, The New Weapons Being Used in Waging War Against Pornography,
7 CAP. U.L. Rnv. 553 (1978) (discussing alternative means of combatting pornography and obscen-
ity); Note, Enjoining Obscenity as a Public Nuisance and the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 84 COLUM. L.
Rv. 1616 (1984) (discussing developments in enjoining obscenity distribution under a nuisance
theory).
55. 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
56. Id. at 722.
57. Acting under authority of Mo. REv. STAT. § 542.380 (1951), the issuing magistrate, after
receiving a complaint swearing that obscene materials were known to be kept on petitioner's prem-
ises, issued a search warrant directing seizure of all obscene materials found on petitioner's premises.
This warrant was issued without examination of any of the obscene materials (although police had
copies of five such magazines) and without providing petitioner an opportunity to dispute the ob-
scenity determination. Marcus, 367 U.S. at 717-23.
58. Marcus, 367 U.S. at 722-23.
59. Approximately 11,000 items were seized. Id.
60. Id. at 731.
61. The Court's framing of the issue is revealing on this point: "The question here is whether
the use by Missouri in this case of the search and seizure power to suppress obscene publications
involved abuses inimical to protected expression." Id. at 729-30; see also Burnett, Obscenity. Search
and Seizure and the First Amendment, 51 DEN. U.L. REV. 41, 55 (1974) (tracing the interplay of the
first and fourth amendments in the Court's decisions involving the seizure of allegedly obscene
materials).
62. Marcus, 367 U.S. at 732.
63. Id. at 736.
64. Only one-third of the books seized were eventually determined to be obscene, a fact the
Court noted "strengthens the conclusion that discretion to seize allegedly obscene materials cannot
be confided to law enforcement officials without greater safeguards than were here operative." Id. at
733.
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straint on the dissemination of protected materials. 65 The Court determined
that the qualitative nature of the objects seized required a fourth amendment
probable cause determination that was sensitive to the presumptive protections
of the first amendment so as to avoid an "erosion of . . . constitutional
guarantees." 66
In A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas67 the Court struck down a state
statute that authorized the mass seizure68 of books without a preseizure determi-
nation of obscenity. 69 In execution of a search warrant, police had seized multi-
ple copies of thirty-one titles of allegedly obscene books, resulting in a total
seizure of over 1,700 books.70 Justice Brennan, in a plurality opinion, held the
statute unconstitutional on the ground that it did not adequately protect nonob-
scene books from seizure. 71 Specifically, Justice Brennan noted that "since the
warrant... authorized the sheriff to seize all copies of the specified titles, and
since [defendant] was not afforded a hearing on the question of the obscenity
even of the seven novels before the warrant issued, the procedure was... consti-
tutionally deficient." 72 As in Marcus, the constitutional deficiency stemmed
from both the qualitative nature of the items seized and the quantitative nature
of the seizure. Justice Brennan specifically rejected the notion that "the stan-
dards governing searches and seizures of allegedly obscene books should not
differ from those applied with respect to [contraband].173 Thus, the ultimate
mandate of the holding was that a preseizure determination of obscenity and
seizure of something less than all copies of allegedly obscene material would be
required to observe the "higher" standard controlling mass seizure of presump-
tively protected materials. 74
In Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia7 5 the Court rejected the seizure of one
copy of a film because the warrant had been issued in a manner that failed to
65. The Court noted:
But there is no doubt that an effective restraint-indeed the most effective restraint possi-
ble-was imposed prior to hearing on the circulation of the publications in this case, be-
cause all copies on which the police could lay their hands were physically removed from
the newsstands and from the premises of the wholesale distributor.
Id. at 736.
66. Id. at 733.
67. 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
68. Although the prior adversary hearing requirement was rejected for single seizures for evi-
dentiary purposes in Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973) (discussed infra notes 89-97 and
accompanying text), it remains a prerequisite for mass seizures. See P.J. Video, 106 S. Ct. at 1614.
69. Copies of Books, 378 U.S. at 208. The case involved an information filed by a district attor-
ney in Kansas, in which he alleged that 57 books published under a specific caption were obscene
and being disseminated from a local bookstore. The attorney attached seven copies of the captioned
books to the information, and after an ex parte determination of probable obscenity, a magistrate
issued a warrant for the seizure of all titles listed in the information. Copies of Books, 378 U.S. at
208-09.
70. Id. at 209.
71. Id. at 208.
72. Id. at 210.
73. Id. at 211-12.
74. Id. at 210-13.
75. 392 U.S. 636 (1968).
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protect first amendment interests.76 The petitioner in Lee Art Theatre was the
operator of a motion picture theater where the allegedly obscene film was being
shown.7 7 The officer applying for the warrant made out an affidavit based on his
observation of the film and advertisements, testifying that the film was ob-
scene.78 The magistrate issued the warrant on the force of the police officer's
conclusion that the film in question was obscene.7 9 Without any reference to
prior restraint, the Court held that the procedures used in the issuance of the
warrant failed to "'focus searchingly' on the question of obscenity" and for that
reason were constitutionally deficient.80
In these cases the Supreme Court focused almost exclusively on the first
amendment in reaching its holdings. These holdings, issued by the Warren
Court, are expansive in their protections of presumptively protected materials.
In subsequent cases, however, the Court shifted its emphasis to deal with the
seizure issue in a fourth amendment context.
The Court first used the fourth amendment as a rationale for deciding a
contested seizure of presumptively protected materials in Roaden v. Kentucky.8 1
Roaden involved the seizure of an allegedly obscene film from a theater incident
to the arrest of the manager for displaying the film.82 No warrant was obtained
for the seizure, nor was any prior hearing conducted to determine probable ob-
scenity. 83 The Court held that seizure of allegedly obscene material without a
constitutionally sufficient warrant was unreasonable per se under the fourth
amendment. 84 Noting that a prior restraint of books or films "calls for a higher
hurdle in the evaluation of reasonableness,1 85 the Court reasoned that the pre-
sumptive protection of the first amendment required a different standard of rea-
sonableness for searches under the fourth amendment. 86 The Court concluded
by quoting Stanford v. Texas,87 noting that "'in short, . . . the constitutional
requirement that warrants must particularly describe the "things to be seized" is
to be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude when the "things" are books, and
the basis for their seizure is the ideas which they contain.' "88 This language
clearly indicates the fourth amendment's subordinance to the first amendment in
the Court's interpretation of the Constitution. It indicates also that only a closer
examination of the basis of probable cause is required.
76. Id. at 637.
77. Id. at 636.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 637.
81. 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
82. Id. at 497-98.
83. Id. at 498-99.
84. Id. at 504.
85. Id. The Court noted, "The setting of the bookstore or the commercial theater, each pre-
sumptively under the protection of the First Amendment, invokes such Fourth Amendment warrant
requirements because we examine what is 'unreasonable' in light of the values of freedom of expres-
sion." Id.
86. Id. at 501.
87. 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
88. Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504 (quoting Stanford, 379 U.S. at 485).
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The holdings discussed thus far established that some higher standard of
reasonableness is required in the seizure of presumptively protected materials. It
is also evident that the initial holdings, which expounded broad protections and
were analyzed on a first amendment basis, have been tempered to a degree by the
implication that the fourth amendment, if scrupulously applied, adequately pro-
tects first amendment concerns. This implication and concurrent limitations on
the qualitative protection of presumptively protected materials soon became the
express holding of the Court.
In Heller v. New York 8 9 the Court adopted a somewhat less expansive view
of the protections surrounding the seizure of presumptively protected, allegedly
obscene materials. Heller involved the warranted seizure of an allegedly obscene
film from a movie theater.90 The issuing judge viewed the film in question im-
mediately prior to issuing the warrant. 9 1 In Heller the Court held that the evi-
dentiary seizure of a motion picture, when supported by a constitutionally
sufficient warrant, is constitutionally permissible.92 The Court expressly re-
jected defendant's argument that a preseizure determination of obscenity was
required. 93 The Court based its holding on a determination that the procedure
followed by the New York courts allowed a reasonable determination of prob-
able cause and that first amendment concerns were adequately protected when
seizure was for evidentiary purposes.94 The Court further determined that a
prompt post-seizure obscenity determination was required, 95 that the seizure
could not constitute a final restraint,9 6 and that on petition the film was available
to be copied by defendant to ensure continued access to the public. The Court
also relied on the contrast between the wholesale seizures in Marcus and Copies
of Books and the single seizure in this case.9 7
The essence of the Court's reasoning appears to have been that no prior
restraint existed under the facts and that sufficient safeguards had been em-
ployed to protect defendant's first amendment interests.98 Although couched in
terms indicating it was an exception to first amendment protections, the holding
89. 413 U.S. 483 (1973).
90. Id. at 483.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 492-94.
93. Id. at 488-89.
94. The Court noted that "[tihere has been no showing that the seizure of a copy of the film
precluded its continued exhibition." Id. at 490. At any rate, evidentiary seizure did not subject the
film "to any form of 'final restraint'" Id. But see United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402
U.S. 363 (1971) (invalidating seizure of allegedly obscene photographs at port of entry into the
United States); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (invalidating a state statute requiring
submission of films to a state censor prior to dissemination).
95. In Heller the determination took 48 days. Heller, 413 U.S. at 490. The Court defined
prompt as "the shortest period 'compatible with sound judicial resolution.'" Id. at 492 n.9 (quoting
United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 367 (1971)).
96. Id. at 490. In reviewing the warrant application the judge viewed the film in question. This
evidently was an attempt to observe a sensitivity to freedom of expression, see supra note 85, by
observing a greater reasonableness in the seizure of protected materials. See Overstock Book Co. v.
Barry, 436 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Santiago, 424 F.2d 1047, 1048 (Ist Cir. 1970);
Monica Theatre v. Municipal Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 1, 14-15, 88 Cal. Rptr. 71, 80-81 (1970).
97. Heller, 413 U.S. at 491.
98. Id. at 492.
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established that when first amendment concerns such as prior restraint are pro-
cedurally safeguarded, the fourth amendment provides adequate protection for
the seizure of one copy of a film for evidentiary purposes.
Thus, the evolution of the relationship of first amendment protections of
speech and press to fourth amendment requirements for searches and seizures in
the context of obscenity seizures has been one of constriction. The expansive
protective language of Marcus and Copies of Books has been limited by the
fourth amendment's absorption of that protective role, at least to the extent of
evidentiary seizures when procedural safeguards "adequately" protect first
amendment concerns.99 The remaining difficulties, however, involve what the
Court has left unsaid. The distinctions between evidentiary seizures and final
restraints, as well as the distinction between mass seizures and single seizures,
leave wide factual possibilities unclear.
In light of this history, the significance of P.J. Video is fourfold. First, the
result is startling because the Supreme Court appears to have reversed a New
York Court of Appeals' holding that never existed. Second, the holding elimi-
nates the protection of the first amendment as applied to presumptively pro-
tected materials seized for evidentiary purposes.'00 Third, the result perpetuates
a continuing trend of the modern Court to assume jurisdiction over situations in
which the federal interest is negligible. Last, the holding foreshadows height-
ened national enforcement of obscenity statutes free from the inhibiting spectre
of first amendment presumptive protection.
Even a rudimentary examination of the Supreme Court's manner of fram-
ing the issue in P.J Video reveals that the Court took a different approach to the
resolution of the issue than did the New York Court of Appeals. The state court
postulated that "[tihis appeal concerns the very basic issue of what information
must be contained in an affidavit supporting a search warrant to authorize the
seizure of [first amendment] materials." 10 1 In contrast, the Supreme Court
stated that "[t]his case concerns the proper standard for issuance of a warrant
authorizing the seizure of [first amendment] materials."10 2 The state court ap-
proach would superficially appear to be an examination of facts to determine
compliance with an existing probable cause standard; the Supreme Court ap-
proach would examine the standard itself. A reasonable reading of the state
court's holding leads to the conclusion that the Court reversed the establishment
of a "higher" standard of probable cause that was never promulgated.103
The New York Court of Appeals' holding was a procedural determination
that the Justice who issued the contested warrant did not have probable cause as
required by the fourth amendment and state law. This holding was derived from
99. See George, supra note 52, at 208-09.
100. Arguably, however, Heller reached this result. See Sequoia Books, Inc. v. McDonald, 725
F.2d 1091, 1093-94 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 405-06 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
101. People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 566, 568, 483 N.E.2d 1120, 1122, 493 N.Y.S.2d 988,
990 (1985), rev'd sub. nom, New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 1610 (1986).
102. P.J. Video, 106 S. Ct. at 1612.
103. See People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 299-301, 501 N.E.2d 556, 558-59, 508
N.Y.S.2d 907, 909-10 (1986); infra note 132.
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the court's reliance on a "higher standard for evaluation of a warrant application
seeking to seize such things as books and films." 1 4 The court applied this stan-
dard to the issuing Justice's reliance on the affidavits and concluded that they
did not provide sufficient information to establish probable cause under New
York's three-prong test for obscenity.105 The court characterized the affidavits
as not permitting even "an inference that the scenes described [were] more than
a catalog of offensive parts of the whole." °10 6 The court concluded that although
the affidavits described scenes that clearly were offensive, 107 they provided no
adequate support for a determination that the films' appeal was primarily to the
prurient interest, or that as a whole the films lacked serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.108 Thus, the issuing magistrate's reliance solely on
the affidavits did not satisfy the stringency requirement in making a probable
cause determination for seizure of presumptively protected materials.
The Supreme Court interpreted the lower court's holding as establishing a
"'higher' standard of probable cause" when issuing warrants for the seizure of
first amendment materials. 10 9 Although the Court never clearly articulated
what it construed this "higher" standard to be, it relied on the court of appeals'
language to the effect that a "higher standard for evaluation of a warrant appli-
cation [was required]."' 10 Apparently the Court mistook a standard for eviden-
tiary scrutiny, which was well founded in Supreme Court precedent,11  for the
assertion of an elevated standard of the sufficiency of the evidence.
More significant than the Court's questionable interpretation of the lower
court's holding is its elimination of first amendment protections for evidentiary
seizures of allegedly obscene materials.112 As discussed previously, a review of
104. P.J. Video, 65 N.Y.2d at 569, 483 N.E.2d at 1123, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
105. Id. at 570-71, 483 N.E.2d at 1124, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 992; see supra note 22.
106. P.J. Video, 65 N.Y.2d at 571, 483 N.E.2d at 1124, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
107. Id.
108, Id.
109. ).J. Video, 106 S. Ct. at 1614.
110. Id. The Court neither identified nor discussed a section of the court of appeals' holding that
arguably could have supported its perception of an elevated probable cause standard. Petitioner
noted this language in his brief and argued that it established an elevated standard of probable cause.
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 2, P.J. Video. The language in question was as follows: "[Tihe affidavits
[must permit the issuing magistrate] to determine that [the films] are within the statutory definition
of obscenity and thus are not entitled to constitutional protection." P.J. Video, 65 N.Y.2d at 571-72,
483 N.E.2d at 1124, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 992. Out of context this passage appears to justify the Court's
interpretation of the court of appeals' holding; however, the passage was made in the context of a
discussion of the probable cause determination necessary for warrant issuance. Thus, the reasonable
interpretation is that this is a misstatement by the court. To take this passage literally would require
belief that the court was prescribing a proof determination requirement prior to seizure, a notion
that is inconsistent with the tone of its opinion and is unmentioned by the Supreme Court.
11I. See Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504; Stanford, 379 U.S. at 485; Copies of Books, 378 U.S. at 211-12;
Marcus, 367 U.S. at 732.
112. See P.J. Video, 106 S. Ct. at 1615. Given the Court's approval of the "focus searchingly"
requirement of Marcus, it would seem that the stringency protections of the first amendment have
not been removed. In light of the Court's approval of United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), however, it is dubious whether the "focus searchingly" requirement will provide any
substantive protection. Pryba involved seizure of films discovered by an airline employee that were
shown to the F.B.I. when suspected of being obscene. The applications that supported the warrant
authorizing seizure alleged that the movies in question depicted "a male and a female engaged in
sexual intercourse" and "various other sexual activities by males and males" as well as "males and
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Supreme Court precedent reveals that the relative expansiveness of any particu-
lar holding was typically related in some degree to the constitutional rationale
behind the holding and the philosophical attitude of the Court. First amend-
ment decisions of the Warren Court, such as Marcus and Copies of Books, were
expansive in their protection of first amendment materials against the evils of
state repression and intimated that the protections were a result of the heavy
presumption against the constitutional validity of any system constituting a
prior restraint on presumptively protected materials.1 13 In contrast, the later
cases decided by the Burger Court under a fourth amendment examination
tended to focus less on the inherent sacrosanct qualities of books and films.114
This result is probably not extraordinary given that in the first amendment con-
text the allegedly obscene articles were equated to political speech, while in the
fourth amendment context the controversy was a more practical one aimed sim-
ply at adequate protection of materials of marginal societal value from unreason-
able seizure. However, this shift in emphasis also reflects the Court's changing
moral attitude. 115
In P.J. Video the Court set forth a uniform fourth amendment standard for
the issuance of warrants authorizing the seizure of evidence of a crime, exclud-
ing altogether first amendment considerations in evidentiary seizures.1 16 This
standard, taken from Illinois v. Gates,' 17 states that "the task of the issuing mag-
istrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all
the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place."'1 18 The Court in P.J. Video specifically held "that an application for a
warrant authorizing the seizure of materials presumptively protected by the first
amendment should be evaluated under the same standard of probable cause used
to review warrant applications generally."' 1 9 The Court's justification for this
uniform standard, which appears to contradict the express language of prece-
dent,1 20 is that a valid probable cause determination within the context of a
females." Id. at 394. As the court of appeals noted in P.1. Video, this does not appear to be the type
of scrupulous exactitude envisioned by precedent. P.. Video, 65 N.Y.2d at 572 n.4, 483 N.E.2d at
1125 n.4, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 993 n.4.
113. Bantam Books, Inc., v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). For a general discussion of prior
restraint theory, see Redish, supra note 35.
114. See Heller, 413 U.S. 483; Roaden, 413 U.S. 496; Lee Art Theatre, 392 U.S. 636. For a
critique of fourth amendment holdings by the Burger Court, see California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,
395-408 (1985) (Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan, J.J., dissenting).
115. This tension between preferences for free speech or conversely for "reasonable" fourth
amendment protections has been evident in the dissenting opinions of several of the cases cited in
this Note. See Lee Art Theatre, 392 U.S. at 638 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Copies of Books, 378 U.S. at
215 (Harlan, and Clark, J.J., dissenting).
116. P.. Video, 106 S. Ct. at 1615.
117. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
118. Id. at 238-89. For a practical discussion of the effect of Gates, see McLaren, A Lawyer's
Guide to Search Warrants and the New Federalism, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (1986). On remand, the
New York Court of Appeals interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in P.1. Video as extending the
totality of the circumstances test of Gates to first amendment seizures. People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68
N.Y.2d 296, 301, 501 N.E.2d 556, 559, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 910 (1986).
119. P.J. Video, 106 S. Ct. at 1615.
120. "It is no answer to say that obscene books are contraband, and that consequently the stan-
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seizure for evidentiary purposes provides adequate protection for first amend-
ment concerns.121 Although this reasoning superficially appears to be a restate-
ment of Heller, its scope is, in fact, greater. The holding sets forth a scheme
under which first amendment protections are wholly absorbed by the less strin-
gent requirements of the fourth amendment when evidentiary seizures are
made. 122
The Court rationalized its holding by reading the precedent requiring "spe-
cial protections" for first amendment materials in a substantially mechanical
fashion. The Court reduced the holdings in Roaden, Marcus, Copies of Books,
Heller, and Lee Art Theatre to rules controlling highly fact specific situations.
The Court deemed Roaden to stand for the rule that no exigent exception to the
warrant requirement may be made for seizure of books when it would constitute
a prior restraint. 123 The Court equated the holdings in Marcus and Copies of
Books with the proposition that large scale seizure of books constituting a prior
restraint requires a prior adversary hearing on the question of obscenity. 124 The
Court described Heller as imposing a warrant requirement on the evidentiary
seizure of books, even when no prior restraint is implicated.125 Last, the Court
reduced Lee Art Theatre to the proposition that conclusory opinions of police as
to obscenity are insufficient evidence of probable cause for issuance of a war-
rant. 126 Although technically correct renditions of the ultimate holdings of
these cases, the Court's characterizations are hardly faithful to the expansive
discussion in most of the cases in which first amendment considerations were
implicated in the seizure of books and films based on their content.
Thus, the Court's current reasoning authorizes the warranted seizure of
first amendment materials on a showing of probable cause that is in no way
different from the showing required for seizure of other contraband, unless the
seizure would constitute a prior restraint.127 For cases implicating prior re-
straint concerns, the Court simply would require adherence to precedent.128
This reasoning presents a very streamlined approach to the problems involved in
the seizure of presumptively protected materials; however, it ignores concerns of
dards governing searches and seizures of allegedly obscene books should not differ from those ap-
plied with respect to narcotics, gambling paraphernalia [sic] and other contraband." Copies of
Books, 378 U.S. at 211-12. The Marcus Court noted:
The authority to the police officers under the warrants issued in this case, broadly to seize
obscene ... publications, poses problems not raised by the warrants to seize gambling
implements and all intoxicating liquors .... For the use of these warrants implicates
questions whether the procedures leading to their issuance and surrounding their execution
were adequate to avoid suppression of constitutionally protected publications.
Marcus, 367 U.S. at 731.
121. P.J. Video, 106 S. Ct at 1615.
122. The mandate to "focus searchingly" on the question of obscenity, as declared in Marcus,
appears to have survived, but also appears to be a de minimis standard in the eyes of the Court. See
supra note 112.




127. Id. at 1615.
128. Id. at 1614.
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suppression of protected speech and the chilling effect that even an evidentiary
seizure can have on the dissemination of protected speech. In addition, the
Court's holding presents some disturbing possibilities. Given the Court's con-
clusion that proper evidentiary seizures do not constitute prior restraints and
that no special protections exist when no threat of restraint exists, 129 the possi-
bility of massive evidentiary seizures looms. Even if the Court would protect
against this eventuality, another question remains-at what point does an evi-
dentiary seizure become a seizure tainted by restraint on protected materials? In
P.J Video, in which the Court summarily dismissed this question, the police had
seized multiple evidentiary copies of the films in question, and the almost certain
implication is that they seized all copies that they could find.' 30
A third aspect of the Court's holding in P.J. Video involves what the dissent
termed "a dubious notion of [the] Court's institutional role." 131 In virtually all
prior holdings dealing with the issue of seizure of presumptively protected
materials, the Court had been protecting the individual liberties of citizens
against intrusion by the state or federal government. This clearly is a function
that the Court is both suited for and should perform. P.J Video, however,
presents a case in which the Court invalidated state protection of individual lib-
erties' 32 to aid prosecution of an alleged criminal violation of state law.1 33 The
129. Id. at 1615 n.6.
130. Id. at 1614. The question thus remains as to what facts will trigger the protections against
prior restraint.
131. Id. at 1622 (Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens, J.J., dissenting); see also California v. Carney,
471 U.S. 386, 395-96 (1985) (Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens, J.J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Court's continuing tendency to restrict fourth amendment protections). The dissent noted three
flaws in the Court's current tendency toward reversing state protections of individual liberties: (1)
no substantial federal interest lies in reversing state protections of individual liberties, id. at 2073, (2)
the Court has given the exception priority over the rule, id. at 2071, and (3) the Court has aban-
doned precedential limitations on the exception, id. The P.J. Video Court arguably has accomplished
the latter two with respect to evidentiary seizures of alleged obscenity.
132. A number of states, including New York, have resorted to state constitutions to protect
individual liberties in the face of growing conservatism on the Court. See Note, The Use of State
Constitutional Provisions in Criminal Defense After Michigan v. Long, 65 NEB. L. REV. 605 (1986).
States have had a difficult time in implementing such protections in light of the Court's holding in
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), in which the Court required states basing holdings on
separate state grounds to state so plainly to avoid a presumption of Supreme Court jurisdiction when
federal rights are implicated. Id. at 1040-41.
In New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986), the Court reversed a New York Court of Appeals'
determination that an automobile search by police had violated defendant's rights. In Class defend-
ant was arrested after police noticed a partially concealed gun in his car after stopping it for having a
cracked windshield. The police noticed the gun when moving papers on the dash of the car to locate
the vehicle identification number. The New York Court of Appeals held this to be an unlawful
search. Id. at 963. The Court deemed the court of appeals' reliance on state law and the state
constitution as insufficient to constitute a "plain statement." Id. at 964-69. On remand the New
York Court of Appeals reinstated its original dismissal, reasoning that when it had declared a proce-
dure violative of the state constitution, Supreme Court guidance that it did not violate the United
States Constitution was insufficient justification to reverse its holding, absent compelling circum-
stances. People v. Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431, 494 N.E.2d 444, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1986). Similarly, on
remand the New York Court of Appeals ignored the Supreme Court's holding in P.J. Video and
reinstated its original judgment. People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508
N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986). The court of appeals did so on its assessment that "Article I, § 12 of the State
Constitution imposes a more exacting standard for the issuance of search warrants authorizing the
seizure of allegedly obscene material than does the Federal Constitution." Id. at 299, 501 N.E.2d at
558, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 909. The court went on to explain that although article I, § 12 of the New
York Constitution was virtually identical to the fourth amendment and had in the past generally
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dissent noted that this is "especially incongruous" when obscenity is the basis of
the alleged violation and by definition is determined at the state level, by the
state judiciary. 13 4
The final aspect of P.. Video's significance is its practical effect on the pros-
ecution of obscenity. Obscenity prosecutions have not been commonplace in the
last decade, due primarily to the complexities discussed herein and a prevailing
permissive attitude.13 5 This issue has recently come to the forefront of criminal
prosecution in North Carolina 136 and, in light of the rising conservative attitude
of the country as a whole towards obscenity, is likely to do the same in other
states. As previously noted, changes in the Court's orientation toward obscenity
can encourage its prosecution.13 7 It is reasonable to suggest that a likely result
of P.J Video will be an increase in prosecutions of obscenity. Several lower
courts had earlier arrived at the Court's determination that no substantive first
amendment concerns were implicated in evidentiary seizures of allegedly ob-
scene materials; 138 however, the fact this reasoning was articulated at the
Supreme Court level certainly will reduce any hesitation in obscenity prosecu-
tion on the grounds of potential constitutional invalidity, particularly when ris-
ing public sentiment against pornography and obscenity is encountered.
The conclusion to be drawn from P.. Video is that the Court, like much of
the nation, is taking a more conservative approach toward the inclusion of al-
leged obscenity within the protections of constitutional speech. 13 9 Although
this undoubtably is a laudable moral decision in some people's minds, it is also a
development that undisputably reduces the role of the first amendment's pre-
sumptive protection in the seizure of allegedly obscene materials. Thus, P.J
Video is a decision that should have received more careful consideration than it
been interpreted consistent therewith, it was now more protective than the fourth amendment with
respect to seizures of allegedly obscene materials. Id. at 301-07, 501 N.E.2d at 559-65, 508 N.Y.S.2d
at 910-16.
133. P.J. Video, 106 S. Ct. at 1621 (Marshall, Stevens, and Brennan, J.J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. I FINAL REPORT, supra note 36, at 366-67.
136. In 1985 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted wide-ranging revisions in the state's
obscenity statute. Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 703, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 929 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-190.1 to .20 (1985)). This chapter contained two provisions that are perti-
nent here. The most significant provision was the repeal of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2 (1985) that
had heretofore required a preseizure obscenity determination preceding any seizure of allegedly ob-
scene materials. Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 703, § 2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 929, 930. The second
interesting provision was a declaration in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1(h) (1985) that obscenity
equates to contraband. Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 703, § 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 929, 930. The
general thrust of these revisions was to aid the prosecution of obscenity in the state, which had been
virtually nonexistent for several years. See Currin & Showers, Analysis and Proposed Revision of
State Pornography Laws, CAMPBELL L. OBSERVER, Jan. 31, 1985, at 1; Watts, Obscenity and Re-
lated Offenses, in 1985 NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLArI ON 169 (N.C. Inst. of Gov't); Note, supra note
46.
137. See supra note 52.
138. See supra note 100.
139. In an interview published in the New Jersey Law Journal, Justice Brennan ascribed the
contraction of protections of individual liberties of the Burger Court to the pendulum swing of socie-
tal opinion as a whole. He particularly noted that the Burger Court had made major inroads into the
protections provided individuals by the fourth amendment. Brennan on the Record, N.J.L.J., June
26, 1986, at 20-22.
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apparently was given; it removes first amendment protection from materials that
are undeniably speech within the meaning of the first amendment when seized.
Clearly, the primary purpose of the first amendment is to protect unpopular
speech and ideas from governmental suppression. When, as in P.J. Video, that
protection is denied a class of unpopular ideas-even ideas of admittedly margi-
nal social value-the first amendment's ability to fulfill its primary purpose is
limited. In P.J. Video the Court did not have to eliminate the first amendment
as a substantive check on evidentiary seizures of allegedly obscene materials.
The exception to first amendment protections set forth in Heller previously had
facilitated police seizure of allegedly obscene material for evidentiary pur-
poses.140 The Court's apparent anxiousness to overrule three levels of New
York courts to facilitate an obscenity prosecution, even for the purpose of cor-
recting an arguably misinterpreted constitutional premise, makes the danger of
its holding self-evident. A Supreme Court that reduces the constitutional pro-
tection afforded to the free dissemination of a class of ideas on a subjective judg-
ment that the ideas are not sufficiently important to merit treatment as speech,
when no countervailing government interest exists,' 4 1 sets a dangerous prece-
dent for further erosion of constitutional guarantees.
JAMES H. JEFFRIES IV
140. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
141. The Court has previously allowed restrictions on protected speech when important govern-
mental interests justified the intrusion on the first amendment. See, eg., FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC restrictions on broadcasting vulgar language).
